五、结 论
通过上文分析可见，基于声誉的制度设计对投标企业约束的重要性。招投标过程中，存在着各种利益的冲突，巨大的经济利润的诱惑可能会推动着投标者不自觉地触动自己的道德底线，朝着合谋的方向越陷越深。显然，一个有效健全的声誉约束机制可以规范和引导市场参与者的行为选择，使得投标者能够在实现自身利益最大化的同时不辜负整个社会对他们的道德期盼。由此可见，面对一个好的制度，即使是合谋类型的投标人也有不进行合谋而选择合规经营的激励，在整个宏观经济层面上，科学合理的激励约束机制可以有效诱导企业体现出更强的社会责任感与道德伦理观。
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（责任编辑 易 民）
Mechanism of Preventing Collusion Based on Reputation Constraint
MA Li，NIU Yong
（School of Economics and Management，Wuhan University，Wuhan 430072，Hubei，China）
Abstract：Preventing collusion and building up a scientific and rational system in tending and bidding have always been an important issue to research.By bringing the reputation theory of KMRW into the mechanism design of tending and bidding，this paper analyzed the behavior strategies of tenders and bidders in repeated games under the circumstance of imperfect information.Findings suggest that reputation can be a very strong limitation for market participants，and even the bad bidders will have the incentive of not conspiring in long term games.Under the constraint mechanism of reputation，companies will choose to operate legally and show more responsibility and sense of ethics at macroscopical level.
Key words：reputation；tending and bidding；collusion；constraint mechanism
